Your war, our fatal assumptions
By GLENDA M. GLORIA
(excerpts)
MANILA, Philippines — You gather poor intelligence, act on your own, deploy your trainees to a treacherous terrain infamous for eating troops alive, make a bad call, and in the end get fatal results. The mob cries for blood. They choose to blame policy and context, rather than confront the real issues that led to this mayhem.
You’re used to this. We’d gotten you used to this. With or without peace talks, you’d brought your troops, like sheep, to the slaughter. Or have the people forgotten? Name the place–Basilan, Sulu, Cotabato, Maguindanao–you’d committed a number of fatal errors in the last two decades that would have wiped out your chain of command, if only the system allowed a no-nonsense investigation into any of these.
But grief is a great deodorizer. And as it turns out, it is also a painful nurturer of the status quo.
Remember when Basilan used to be a battlefield, not between your troops and bandits but between your own? Remember when the impoverished island had to put up with the squabbles between your Rangers and your Marines and the terror imposed by the Abu Sayyaf? Remember that fatal, day-long gunfight with kidnappers nearly a decade ago, that cost the lives of young officers and men because your commanders from Manila micromanaged the situation?
Of course, an ousted macho president keeps his own bank of memories.
He boasts that it was his all-out war policy that wiped out the MILF from Camp Abubakar. Well, yes. It used to be that you knew exactly where they were; now they’re scattered all over the place.
...Let’s look at the basic published facts here.
Your troops were on a test mission, “seize and withdraw,” as a spokesman explained it. They were on advanced training as members of an elite unit. Most of them had not been to Basilan before. Their mission? To “locate/arrest/neutralize” a rebel commander charged with kidnapping. They had options before going for the kill:
get the police to lead the way (after all, you could not arrest without a warrant),
inform the joint ceasefire committee that they were about to do this, and
coordinate with (or at the very least inform) Army ground commanders and staff officers in Basilan and Zamboanga, the main headquarters, in case things didn’t turn out as planned. Did they do any of these? Apparently not, and your Inspector General is now trying to dig deeper.
... Nothing could be more fatal for an organization than to be sidetracked from its urgent needs: an honest-to-goodness review of how it draws up its tactics and plans and deploys its people; a strict monitoring of how it spends people’s money and uses its resources; and a much-delayed admission of how poorly trained its men are, how paralyzed headquarters thinking is, and how politicized and unprofessional decision-making had become within the chain.
That’s the undefeated enemy.
And nothing could be more fatal for a nation than to call for war as if it could still be won in the battlefield. – Move.PH